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extra-judicially dissented. But the result is admittedly salutary.
Of course the courts should not be hasty in changing
ihe law; for, among other reasons, the social interest in stability must be adequately secured-therefore, stare decisis as
a rule. But the equally important social interest in progress must also be properly protected; and progress will be
unduly impeded and often completely prevented if we must
always wait for a judicial change until there is no substantial difference of opinion as to the social desirability of
the change. Let us therefore have judges who, though not
hasty leaders of a minority, will cautiously progress with a
preponderant majority, when progress is socially desirable,
even though, as is commonly the case, there is a substantial
minority of reasonable men who think it socially desirable
that our law, like the law of the Medes and Persians,
should change not.
-T. P. HARDMAN.
As to when such progress is socially desirable and therefore Justifiable. ce

my

paper, "Stare Decisis and the Modern Trend," 32 W. VA. L. QUAR. 163 (1926).

SUFFICIENCY OF A NEW PROMISE TO TAKE AN ACCOUNT OUT
OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.-In West Virginia, an ac-

tion upon an account is barred by the statute of limitations
after five years from the date at which "the right to bring
same shall have accrued";1 but it is further provided, in
the chapter dealing with the limitation of suits that:
"If any person against whom the right shall have so
accrued on an award, or on any other contract, shall by
writing signed by him or his agent promise payment of
money on such award or contract, the person to whom
the right shall have so accrued, may maintain an action
or suit for the moneys so promised, within such number
of years after the said promise, as it might originally
have been maintained within, upon the award or contract, and the plaintiff may either sue on such a promise,
or on the original cause of action, and in the latter case,
in answer, to a plea under the sixth section, may, by way
1 WEST

VlIGINIA CODE,

c. 104, § 6.
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of replication, state such promise, and that such action
was brought within the said number of years thereafter;
but no promise, except by writing as aforesaid, shall take
any case out of the operation of the said sixth section,
or deprive any party of the benefit thereof. An acknowledgement in writing as aforesaid, from which a promise
of payment may be implied, shall be deemed to be such
promise within the meaning of this section." 2
From the above statute it appears that a new promise to
pay money, or an acknowledgement of a debt, to remove
the bar of limitations, must be in writing, signed by the
promisor or his agent, and that such a "promise of payment may be implied"-in other words, the written acknowledgement of the debt may be in the form of either
an express or an implied promise to pay it. The question
of the sufficiency of writing-as to whether or not they
constitute such acknowledgement as is required by our
law-has several times been passed upon by the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, and from the court's decisions one can determine with a fair degree of certainty
whether or not any given letter, memorandum, or other
writing is sufficiently definite and unequivocal as to amount
to a new promise under the West Virginia statute.
In the comparatively early case of Abrahams v. Swann," the
court held that if a new promise or clear and definite acknowledgment "is contained in a letter of the defendant to the
plaintiff, it is not necessary, that the amount of the debt
or that its date should be specified in the letter, but the
particular debt, to which the letter refers, may be identified
by extrinsic evidence written or parol; and if so identified
clearly, and the promise is unequivocal, or the acknowledgment is of a subsisting debt, for which the defendant is liable and willing to pay, the bar of the statute of limitations is thereby removed." In this case the debtor wrote
to his creditor as follows: "On my honor you shall be paid
as I get the money over and above my bread and meat * *
* * *.
If I get the money I will then pay you * *
I have acknowledged the debt to you in my letters again
and again; therefore it stands as good as if you had my
bond." This letter was held by the court to be a sufficient
WEST Vnu2INIA CODE, c. 104, § 8.
, 18 W. Va. 274 (1881).
2
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acknowledgment or new promise to remove the bar of the
statute of limitations.
In a case arising soon thereafter, a creditor obtained
judgment against two joint defendants for $852.25, upon
which judgment execution was returned "No property
found." When an administrator's suit was brought, more
than ten years later, against the estate of one of the defendants, the aforesaid judgment creditor presented his
claim, and, to take the case out of the bar of the statute
of limitations, he relied upon a letter written to him by
the decedent, in which the latter stated: "I have received
both of your letters, but I have so much to pay that I had to
have time to consider. I will pay you the agreed balance
on your judgment on the 2nd day of January next, at my
office, at 12 o'clock." In this case, the court arrived at an
opposite conclusion to that in Abrahams v. Swann, 4 by holding
that the letter here did not constitute an acknowledgment
or new promise within the statute. The court conceded
that this letter sufficiently identified the judgment, and that
it would have constituted a new promise to pay it if it had
not been for the word "agreed" used therein, which indicated that the defendant did not promise to pay the balance, but the "agreed balance." "This imports that they
[the parties] had before that agreed upon an amount to be
paid, but, if so, that amount does not appear. The new
promise cannot operate, because of want of certainty as to
amount, in the absence of that amount appearing * * * the
letter meant that Quarrier [the debtor] had been considering whether he would pay anything at all, but that he
had concluded that, if he and Grogan [the creditor] could
thereafter agree upon an amount, he would pay that. This
would be a conditional promise to pay; that is, if they
should agree, and, moreover, uncertain as to the amount,
in the absence of an actual agreement on the amount * * *
The new promise must not be vague, indefinite, uncertain."
The debtor must acknowledge a sum certain, or at least a
readily ascertainable balance. 5
In another case, an administrator brought suit against a
mining company, for salary, in the amount of $31,200.00,
due to the decedent as agent of the defendant company
'Supra, n. 3.
' Quarrier's Adm'r v. Quarrier's Heirs et al., 36 W. Va. 310, 16 S. E. 164 (1892).
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over a period of twenty-six years; and the plaintiff, in his
bill, admitted that a sum of $4,553.90 was due out of the
decedent's estate to the defendant company. The court,
in holding that the acknowledgment in the bill did not constitute a new promise, described the admission in the pleading as "conditional, not an unqualified acknowledgment
* * * * for it is only a proposition to allow said sum of
$4,553.90, provided there should be allowed to the credit
of the estate its whole demand of $31,200.00 * * * *. It
must be unconditional and indicate that the party is actually liable and willing to pay-unconditionally willing." 6
In other words, the acknowledgment, required to operate
as a new promise to remove the bar of the statute of limitations, must be a clear, definite, and unequivocal acknowledgment in writing of a subsisting debt.
Where a debt is within the bar of the statute of limitations, and a new promise or acknowledgment is relied upon
to remove the statutory bar, there must be an express
promise to pay, or an acknowledgment of the debt, unaccompanied by reservations or conditions, from which an
implied promise will arise, and the writing ought to be
such a one as, if declared upon, would support the action
-and the West Virginia Court so hold, in Bank of Union v.
NickeUl et al.7 In this case-a creditor's suit against a decedent's estate-the following letter from the administrator's intestate was relied upon by a creditor to take his
claim out of the statute of limitations, by which it would
otherwise be barred:
"Sinks Grove, W. Va., Jan. 12, 1899
"Mr. J. B. Fisher, Dear Sir:-I enclose a check for
$15.00, it is the best I can do for you at present. I just
happened to get it yesterday. Hope this will be satisfactory. Love to all. With kind wishes to all the family I
am your obedient servant,
"C. Patton Nickell.
"Please send me a receipt for the $15.00 fifteen dollars."
The court was of the opinion that:
"There is nothing contained in this letter that even
shows an acknowledgment upon the part of Nickell that
he is indebted to Fisher and, if it could be so construed,
Stiles v. Laurel Fork Oil & Coal Co. et al.,47 W.

Va. 838, 35 S. E. 986

(1900).

57 IV. Va. 57, 49 S. E. 1003 (1905).
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it certainly does not fix any specific sum, which would
have to be done in order to remove the statute. In
order to create such a promise under the law as to take
the claim without the statute of limitations there must
be an express promise to pay, or an acknowledgment,
unaccompanied by reservations or conditions, from which
an implied promise will arise * * * . All that Nickell did
was to send Fisher the check for $15.00 and say to him,
'This is the best I can do for you at present.' How
could this be construed as a promise to pay or an acknowledgment of the debt? There is no sum named and
no reference to anything by which it could be ascertained, and nothing in the letter to show that he did not
intend to rely upon the statute of limitations."
Turning to the decisions in point, of Virginia, a state
whose case law is often of peculiarly persuasive (though
since the separation not binding) authority of this State, it
is to be noted that the Supreme Court of Appeals of that
State has held 8 that a new promise sufficient to remove the
bar of the statute of limitations "must be determinate and
unequivocal; and that to imply a promise of payment from
a subsequent acknowledgment, such an acknowledgment
must be an unqualified admission of a subsisting debt which
the party is liable for and willing to pay," citing in support
of this doctrine Bell v. Morrison et al.,O and Bell v. Craw10
ford.
In another Virginia case decided the following year, the
plaintiff conceded that partial payments made on a promissory note upon which he was seeking recovery in an action of assumpsit did not take the note out of the statute
of limitations, but argued that the case was taken without
the statute by a new promise in writing. But the court rejected the plaintiff's contention, holding that:
"Upon a careful consideration of the evidence we are
satisfied that such is not the case; for, giving to the
language of the letters relied upon to establish the new
promise its largest import, it does not amount to such an
acknowledgment of the debt as that a promise to pay
may be implied from it, and it is well settled that a promSwitzer v. Noffeinger 82 Va. 618 (1886).
1 Pet. 851 (1828).
8 Gratt. 110 (1851). This case holds that a "promise which will remove the
bar of the statute of limitations must be a promise to pay a debt: And a promise to
settle with a claimant is not sufficient."
15
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ise merely to settle with the claimant is not sufficient.""
In Cole'g Ex'r. v. Martin, 2 a physician endeavored to recover for services to an executor's testatrix. While in a
partnership, terminated in 1880, and while alone from 1880
to 1888, the claimant rendered services for which no bills
were ever presented. For his services from .1888 to 1895,
when he removed to another city, annual bills were presented and paid, with the exception of the year 1894.
Testatrix wrote to her physician, when he moved in 1895,
that:
"It is a shame that this move has been made necessary
by our failing to pay what we owe you. Let me have my
bill, and you shall have what I owe you in a short time.
I shall borrow the money if I can't get it any other way * *
* * . If I could only draw in my means, I could payyou every
cent I owe you tomorrow. Enough, however. You send the
bill, and I will arrange everything for you."
The court was of the opinion that it was reasonable to
conclude that the letter of testatrix had reference only to
the bill for the unpaid services from January 1, 1894, to
the date of her letter, and not to the partnership account of
the claimant, which was from fifteen to twenty-six years
old, or to the account from 1880 to 1888, :for neither of
which accounts had appellee ever presented a bill-that,
since the letter relied upon did not clearly refer to the
partnership and individual accounts prioi to 1888, it did
not remove the bar of the statute of limitations as to them,
but applied only to the unpaid bill of 1894. However, if
there were "an 'unequivocal admission that the debt is still
due and unpaid, unaccompanied by an expression, declaration, or qualification indicative of an intention not to pay,
the state of facts out of which the law implies a promise
is then present, and the party is bound by it."'13
It may be said, in conclusion, that, to repel the bar of
limitations the statute 4 requires that there must be in
writing either an express promise to pay, or a clear, deft11Gover

v. Chamberlain, 83 Va. 286, 5 S. E. 174 (1887).
P 99 Va. 223, 37 S. E. 907 (1901).
"Rowe's Adm'rs v. Mlarchant, 86 Va. 177, 9 S. E. 996 (1889), quoting with approval Tindal, C. J., in Linsell v. Bonsor, 2 Bing. N. C. 241, 29 E. C. L. 519; to
the effect that: "A distinct and unqualified acknowledgment would have the same
effect as a promise because from such acknowledgment the law implies a promise to
pay."

14Supra, n. 2.
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nite and unequivocal acknowledgment of a subsisting debt
which the party is actually liable for and unconditionally
willing to pay. The acknowledgment must clearly refer to
the particular account, or accounts, sought to be saved
,from the statutory bar. In such a written acknowledgment by the debtor to the creditor, it is not necessary that
he amount of the debt or that its date should be specified
therein, but the particular debt, to which reference is made,
may be identified by extrinsic evidence, written or parol.
A. new promise cannot operate, .to repel the bar of the
statute, in the event of there being a want of certainty as
to the amount of the debt, or the part thereof revived by
such new promise-as where the party promised to pay the
"agreed balance,"'1 the amount of which remained undetermined. Neither partial payments made on an account,
nor a promise merely to settle with a claimant, is sufficient
to stop the running of the statute-there must be a new
promise or an acknowledgment of a fixed sum, -or at least
a balance which "should admit of a ready and certain
ascertainment."' 8
-GEORGE
D. HOTT.*
15 Supra, n. 5.
'

Huff v. Richardson, 19 Pa. St. 389 (1852).

* Member of bar, Morgantown, W. Va.
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